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This paper explores the circumstances around the setting up of the Harpurhey Resettlement Team, an
innovative project which, in the late 1980s, resettled around 20 long-stay patients from Springﬁeld
Hospital in North Manchester into ordinary tenancies within the same neighbourhood. It argues that
Springﬁeld’s position as a marginalised and neglected institution produced the conditions for such
innovation; while the particular and unexpected convergence of national policies, local structures and
institutional politics created space for a process of change which, in both form and outcome, could not
have occurred in the more regulated psychiatric environments elsewhere in Manchester.
& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
So I got to know y I can’t remember if it was two people
or one person, but the person I remember is Winifred,1
who was a woman living in Springﬁeld, on a ward in
Springﬁeld, and as part of the ‘Getting to Know You’ process
we had to be with them in the hospital, had to be with them
outside and then after that we had to read the notes. But it was
[pause] it made the planning process into a very personal
thing, which was .. which was wonderful. You know, it wasn’t
about just some group of people over there, you became
attached to this particular person and wanted to make the plan
work for them.
(Interview 1: Research Assistant, Getting to Know You Project)
The above quotation provides an unusual introduction to a
paper which is essentially about service development. Firstly, the
speaker—a young Cambridge graduate, working initially as a
volunteer and later on a temporary research contract funded by
the Manpower Services Commission—is not a ﬁgure one would
normally associate with strategic service planning. Secondly,
neither his language nor tone is typical of someone engaged in
the purportedly rational and objective activity of service design.
And thirdly, establishing a deeply personal relationship with an
elderly woman, incarcerated on a psychiatric backward for the
past 40 years, is hardly the starting point most planners would
choose for developing new ways of delivering mental health
services to the local community. But then, the service aroundY license.
n).
t conﬁdentiality.which this paper is based was highly unusual—and, indeed, in
terms of both origin and intent, represented a fundamental
challenge to the prevailing models of both mental illness and
mental illness services.
The service in question was the Harpurhey Resettlement Team
which, in the late 1980s, resettled between 20 and 25 long-stay
patients from Springﬁeld Hospital in North Manchester. The
project differed from traditional resettlement programmes in a
number of key ways. Firstly, the accommodation took the form of
ordinary tenancies—individually rented ﬂats and houses as
opposed to the more usual pattern of hostels, group homes and
sheltered housing schemes. Secondly, the whole project was built
around the notion of neighbourhood. The entire cohort moved to
the same geographical district, a small, well-established neigh-
bourhood of approximately one square mile in area, and from the
beginning the focus was as much on developing links with the
local community as on clinical practice—something which was
underlined both by the presence of an experienced community
development worker in the team and by the fact that a signiﬁcant
proportion of support workers were appointed on the basis of
their connections with the area, rather than any direct mental
health experience. Thirdly, despite this broad range of personnel,
skills and backgrounds, the team structure was explicitly non-
hierarchical, with no team leader, decision-making by consensus,
skill-sharing and, in the early stages, broad parity between the
support workers in terms of both pay and job descriptions. Given
that half the support workers were qualiﬁed psychiatric nurses
employed by the health authority, and half were social services
workers who were mainly unqualiﬁed, local people, this latter
feature was particularly unusual—as, indeed was the fact that the
project was jointly managed by health and social services. Finally,
the team was closely involved with radical mental health issues
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independent and highly vocal North Manchester Users’ Group.2
The focus of this paper will be on the setting up of the service:
the context, both national and local, within which it developed;
the drivers and mediators of change; and the mechanisms and
processes involved. Clearly, the actual number of patients
resettled by the team represents only a small proportion of the
hospital’s several hundred long-stay population. In symbolic
terms, however, the project was hugely signiﬁcant, occupying a
central position in the massive political upheavals which
accompanied the transfer of services away from the old mental
hospital into new settings. As such, the case study provides a
fascinating window through which to explore the dynamics of
change and, more speciﬁcally, to trace the interplay between the
national and the local: not only how national policies were
implemented and interpreted on the ground but also how broader
social and political themes were played out within the context of
local service development. Within this, the notion of place plays a
central role: ﬁrstly, in relation to the actual service model;
secondly, in terms of Springﬁeld itself and the ways in which its
very particular history and geography created the conditions for
non-mainstream forms of innovation; and thirdly, echoing
Spandler’s notion of ‘convergent space’, as a particular ‘place in
time’, in which a unique—and in this instance often contra-
dictory—combination of political forces and social actors came
together in one ‘speciﬁc, local convergent site’ (Spandler, 2006,
p. 23).
My sources are predominantly oral, drawn from interviews
with practitioners and service providers which have been
conducted over the past 3 years as part of my PhD, a broader
post-war history of mental health services in Manchester and
Salford (Harrington, 2008). Recruited largely through the ‘snow-
balling’ technique (Crossley, 2006), my 22 North Manchester
informants represent a range of perspectives and occupational
backgrounds: from key ﬁgures within the services to frontline
workers; from the drivers of innovation to those who were
required to adapt and implement the changes within their day-
to-day practice; and from opponents as well as advocates of
change. What is clearly missing is the voice of service users. This is
due to the constraints of both time and space and reﬂects how,
with a primary focus on service dynamics and organisational
issues, staff rather than patients were the natural target group.
The oral testimonies are augmented by documentary evidence in
the form of reports, minutes and service materials.The backdrop to the services
The story begins in 1982, towards the end of Margaret
Thatcher’s ﬁrst term in ofﬁce and a period of deep political and
social turmoil. The public services were, in effect, being dis-
mantled, as the welfare state was transformed into a ‘mixed2 Not all would agree that the project constituted a signiﬁcant innovation. It
was never recognised within conventional psychiatric circles and one interviewee
likened it to the Emperor’s New Clothes—little more than rhetoric. Others, while
acknowledging its intrinsic value, have downgraded its wider signiﬁcance and
inﬂuence. I would argue, however, that it was important in a number of ways:
ﬁrstly, it was a genuine, and, during that period, relatively rare attempt to embrace
alternative models of mental health care within a statutory setting; secondly, it
was absolutely central to the broader cultural changes which Springﬁeld under-
went during that period; thirdly, it aroused considerable national interest at the
time; and ﬁnally, many of the actors involved—a number of whom now have
senior positions within mental health—have acknowledged how their experiences
with Harpurhey project have strongly inﬂuenced their current thinking and
practice: ‘We are all who we are because of it partly’ (Interview 6: Member of
Getting to Know You Core Planning Group)—or, as one interviewee put it ‘some of
the sparksy [are] still sparkling’ (Interview 4: Member of North Manchester DHA).economy of welfare’, characterised, according to Rogers and
Pilgrim (2001), by the triple themes of ‘privatisation, market-
isation and managerialism’. The other side of Thatcherismwas the
huge wave of opposition that her policies fuelled and the new
generation of left wing activism they spawned. At a local level this
opposition took a particularly interesting form, with the springing
up of loose networks of likeminded people, mobilising around
speciﬁc issues and projects. A signiﬁcant proportion involved the
reframing of traditional health or welfare issues within a broader,
left wing agenda, and the drawing in of actors and resources from
a range of backgrounds and perspectives—inﬂuencing services in
ways which had not been predicted and creating and fostering
strong links across various sectors and levels of service. These
links were to prove pivotal both in this story, and more generally
in the increasingly complex and ﬂuid world of the late twentieth
century British health and welfare services.
The mental health context: deinstitutionalisation and mental health
activism
Speaking personally, I felt that there were three currents, three
strands that were going. One was the ‘Survivors Speak Out’3
stuff, so it’s actually service users’ autonomous voice work that
was comingythe second one was very much our strand, which
was the resettlement programme, because it wasn’t just us, it
was happening across the UKyAnd then the third one is
theylegacy of people like Laing and so on, Cooper,4 so people
who had set up alternative, counter-therapy type.. therapeutic
communitiesy and it was that melange of the three that I
felt..heady days.
(Interview 2: Nurse on the Harpurhey Resettlement Team)
Within this broader context of economic and public service
reform the mental health services were facing their own
particular pressures, brought on by an accelerating programme
of deinstitutionalisation. The run down of the large mental
hospitals had been ﬁrmly on the agenda since Enoch Powell’s
famous ‘water tower’ speech of 1961,5 but progress over the
subsequent two decades had been slow and gradual. In 1975, for
example, the Government White Paper, Better Services for the
Mentally Ill, had highlighted how, although mental hospital
populations were falling, levels had not yet halved and no
institution had closed. Its publication represented an important
landmark in mental health policy and an unequivocal endorse-
ment of district-based psychiatric services, supported by a range
of facilities within the community. In the increasingly harsh
economic climate of the late 1970s, however, both Regional Health
Authorities and Local Authority Social Services Departments were
generally slow to respond—a position which pertained until 1984,
when a government directive was sent out to the Regional Health
Authorities, requiring them to produce deﬁnite plans for the run-
down and closure of all large mental hospitals in their region
(DHSS, 1975; Jones, 1993; Busﬁeld, 1986; MIND, 1983; NWRHA,3 Survivors Speak Out, which emerged in 1985, was the ﬁrst of a series of
national networks of service users (Campbell, 2005).
4 R.D. Laing and David Cooper were key ﬁgures in what Cooper was the ﬁrst to
term the ‘anti-psychiatry movement’ of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Both
psychiatrists were heavily involved in the broader radical politics of the 1960s and
in the establishment of a number of therapeutic communities in London, which
challenged existing models of and approaches to mental illness. See Crossley
(2006) for more details of their work and inﬂuence.
5 It was in his inaugural speech to the Annual Conference of the National
Association of Mental Health—and with his customary rhetorical ﬂourish—that
Powell ﬁrst introduced his policy of the ‘elimination of by far the greater part of
the country’s mental hospitals’ which stood ‘isolated, majestic, imperious, brooded
over by the gigantic water-tower’ (Jones, 1993, p. 160).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
6 NB Although its ofﬁcial name had been changed to the Department of
Psychiatry, North Manchester General Hospital following the 1974 NHS reorganisa-
tion it was still known as Springﬁeld Hospital and has consistently been referred to
in this way by the people I have interviewed.
V. Harrington / Health & Place 15 (2009) 664–6716661985). This heralded a ﬂurry of activity throughout the country:
between 1985 and March 1993 the number of mental hospital
beds fell from around 60,000 to just over 20,000; 31 institutions
closed; and, of those that remained, most had ﬁrm plans to shut
before the end of the century (Davidge et al., 1993). Community
care—one of the cornerstones of the 1959 Mental Health Act—was
ﬁnally to become a reality and the mental health landscape was
set to change almost beyond recognition.
At the same time, a very different kind of mental health
movement was also gaining momentum. In what arguably
constituted the second wave of ‘anti-psychiatry’, this movement
paralleled, and often overlapped with, the forms of political
opposition already discussed. Again, rather than one distinct
entity it consisted of a loose network of individuals and groups,
united in their general opposition to mainstream psychiatry but,
in terms of background and philosophy ‘a very diverse, ﬂuid,
frequently contradictory counter-culture’ (Greenwood, 2004, p. 1).
Within this, a number of key themes can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst
centred around radical alternatives to service provision, and were
epitomised by the Marxist-inspired services in Trieste in Northern
Italy (Crossley, 2006; Jones, 1993; De Leonardis et al., 1986); the
second concerned broader issues of civil liberties and human
rights; and the third was the growth, in the second half of the
1980s, of the service user movement (Crossley, 2006; Rogers and
Pilgrim, 1991; Campbell, 2005). The latter’s uneven emergence
into what was already a ﬂuid and turbulent ﬁeld disturbed and
eventually transformed the landscape of mental health activism at
a time when the mainstream mental health services were also
undergoing tremendous change. The story of the Harpurhey
Resettlement Team is, to some extent, the story of how these two,
traditionally opposing forces both interacted and collided with
each other in the context of Thatcher’s Britain and a marginalised
and previously neglected mental health service.
North Manchester and its mental health services
North Manchester always felt the poor relation y Nobody
really cared. I don’t say nobody cared, but it felt a bit like that.
It was more important that the teaching hospital bit survived.
You didn’t have to worry about crumbling old buildings up
here.
(Interview 3: Member of North Manchester DHA)
The thing about Springﬁeld Hospitalywas that it was such a
backwater of a place that it had no pretensions or illusionsyit
was the arse-hole of the universe.
(Interview 2: Nurse on the Harpurhey Resettlement Team)
Of Manchester’s three district health authorities—South,
Central and North—North Manchester, whose population in
1987 stood at just under 143,000, accounted for some of the
highest indices of deprivation and health inequalities in the city.
Extending northwards and eastwards from the city centre, eight of
its eleven wards were within inner city areas and much of its
landscape was a testament to post-industrial Britain. Many of its
traditional industries had closed down, leaving in their wake the
highest level of airborne pollution in the country and disturbing
levels of unemployment and hardship. This translated into a
depressing collection of economic and public health statistics:
data compiled from the 1981 census, for example, placed the
majority of North Manchester’s wards near the bottom of Greater
Manchester’s deprivation and health rankings (Townsend, 1988);
in 1987 its standard mortality ratio of 134 was the highest in the
region; and the authority’s illegitimacy and low birth weight rates
in 1988 were almost twice the average for England and Wales
(North Manchester DHA, 1989). Harpurhey was no exception.
Situated just over two miles north of the city centre, with apopulation in 1991 of around 17,000, it was a traditional
white, working-class district. In 2004 it gained the dubious
honour of being named the most deprived neighbourhood in
England, with the poorest quality of life in the country (Tapp,
2004) (Fig. 1).
In 1982, when the story starts, North Manchester’s mental
health services were centred around Springﬁeld Hospital,6 one
of Manchester’s two large mental hospitals. Opened in 1858,
Springﬁeld was unusual in terms of both its history and
geography, which set it apart both from the region’s purpose-
built asylums and the district general psychiatric units
described in the introduction to this theme section (Philo and
Pickstone, 2009). It had started life as Crumpsall Workhouse,
built to relieve pressure on, and eventually replace, existing
facilities in the centre of Manchester. Over the subsequent 60
years it became increasingly populated by the elderly and ‘adults
of unsound mind’ and under the 1913 Mental Treatment Act was
ofﬁcially designated as an institution for housing the feeble-
minded. It still remained under the jurisdiction of the Poor Law,
however, as one of several specialised institutions run by the
Manchester Poor Law Union—indeed, by the 1920s, the Manche-
ster Board, which had merged with the Boards for South
Manchester and Prestwich in 1915, was running a children’s
hospital (Booth Hall), an epileptic colony (Langho) and a facility
for overnight accommodation, in addition to its general poor law
accommodation. It also boasted two major hospitals, Withington
and Crumpsall, the latter having been built as the inﬁrmary for the
Crumpsall Workhouse. Under the reforms of the 1929 Local
Government Act responsibility for Springﬁeld (at that time known
as the Crumpsall Institute) was transferred from the Board of
Guardians to Manchester’s Public Assistance Committee (Green-
wood, 1998), while the Crumpsall Inﬁrmary was taken over by the
Health Committee.
This separation continued during the ﬁrst 25 years of the NHS.
Under the 1946 NHS Act, workhouse accommodation for the
mentally ill and subnormal—which generally comprised a few
wards in the ex-municipal hospitals—was transferred to
the health service. In most towns, such wards now came under
the remit of a local Hospital Management Committee. HMCs
were responsible for administering the ex-municipal and
former charity hospitals in each large town or city-district;
signiﬁcantly, they had no formal connections with the large
asylums which, often distant from population centres and very
much ‘worlds in themselves’, were given their own separate
HMCs. Unusually, and despite its urban location and proximity to
Crumpsall Hospital, Springﬁeld was treated as an asylum: thus,
rather than joining with Crumpsall and other hospitals in North
Manchester, it was grouped with another former poor law
institution, the Swinton Home for mentally subnormal children,
to form its own HMC. Springﬁeld’s workhouse origins, however,
meant that it remained marginal to the constellation of major
asylums inherited by the Manchester Regional Hospital Board
from the Lancashire Asylums Board—whilst also being separated
under the NHS from the institution with which it shared a site.
Springﬁeld was indeed peculiar, and it was to remain marginal in
several ways.
Firstly, although in the early 1970s Crumpsall and Springﬁeld
eventually amalgamated to form North Manchester General
Hospital, Springﬁeld was always the outsider. Despite their shared
history and close physical proximity, and despite the general push
during that period to move psychiatric services out of the asylum
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integrating with the rest of the hospital:
Even within the hospital hierarchy, it was Crumpsall and
Springﬁeld and they had been two separate hospitals. They
were just forced together-they’d been in different hospital
groupsyand I mean ridiculous separation such as that if
somebody had an accident or took ill or something on the
Springﬁeld site nobody wanted to go across to deal with them,
you know, from A&E or surgery or medicine, etc. Nothing to do
with them, sort of thing.
(Interview 4: Member of North Manchester DHA)
There was [pause] a precipice is perhaps too strong a word to
use, but the atmosphere was very.. there was a very marked
contrast between Springﬁeld and Crumpsall.. the acute
hospital, even though they were now part of the same
organisation, and I guess in some ways it was like stepping
back into time.
(Interview 5: Member of North Manchester DHA)
The brick wall which had originally separated the two
institutions had long since been removed (Greenwood, 1998)
but the cultural brick wall clearly still remained—with Springﬁeld
deﬁnitely on the wrong side.
Secondly, Springﬁeld was the least powerful of the North West
Regional Health Authority’s four large mental hospitals. This was
partly due to its late entry into the mental hospital system, but
was also a function of its size and geography. Compared to theneighbouring Prestwich asylum, for example, Springﬁeld was tiny:
in the early post war period, when bed numbers were at their
highest, Prestwich’s population peaked at over 3000 while
Springﬁeld’s barely rose above 600; and by the early 1980s, when
Prestwich still had in excess of 1000 patients, Springﬁeld’s
population had fallen to a few hundred (Hopton, 1999; Danson,
1985; NWRHA, 1985). In contrast to the purpose-built asylums it
was also small in terms of acreage: while Prestwich was
surrounded by extensive parkland, the Springﬁeld site was almost
completely built up. The issue of land availability assumed a
whole new signiﬁcance in the context of the regional health
authority’s plans for psychiatric services during the 1970s and
1980s. Integral to these was the setting up of a range of specialist
facilities to complement the region’s district general units
(Harrington, 2004)—a development which, according to Hugh
Freeman, was only possible because the large mental hospitals
were able to provide both the land and the infrastructure to
support them:
It was only there that space and supporting facilities could be
found to develop the new sub-specialties of psycho-geriatrics,
rehabilitation, drug abuse and forensic psychiatry, which
became the most highly developed in the worldyWhether it
would have been possible without the presence of the mental
hospitals is an interesting question.
(Freeman, 1999, p. 7)
By 1984 Prestwich had 90 new specialist beds—a 44 bedded
forensic unit, an adolescent ward and two centres for the
treatment of alcohol and drug dependency (NWRHA,
1985)—while Springﬁeld had been completely sidelined.
Thirdly, as a predominantly long-stay institution Springﬁeld
was similarly sidelined within Manchester’s wider psychiatric
community. Manchester psychiatry was dominated by the Uni-
versity Department of Psychiatry and its relatively new academic
units at Gaskell House in Central Manchester and Withington
Hospital in South. These espoused a model of acute, district
general psychiatry within a ﬁercely competitive and academic
environment (Kessel, 1973; Harrington, 2008)—a far cry from the
back-wards of Springﬁeld. The cultural divide between Springﬁeld
and its sister units in Central and South Manchester was
underlined by Springﬁeld’s lack of teaching status, which further
compounded the vicious circle of isolation and mutual suspicion.
Finally, this cultural and political divide was not conﬁned to
psychiatry. North Manchester was the only health authority in
Manchester not to have a teaching hospital—a factor which was
not only played out in the health politics of the city but which also
helped to deﬁne how the district saw itself:
North Manchester had.. kind of had this chip on its shoulders. I
remember when I ﬁrst went to, got into association with the
Area through the CHC, I thought it was astonishing really, this,
‘Oh, we never get anything, we’re the poor relations, we
haven’t got a medical school and so on’.
(Interview 5: Member of North Manchester DHA)
Springﬁeld’s already marginalised status was thus com-
pounded by being part of a health authority which, in terms of
power, prestige, resources—and, indeed, self-image—was at a
huge disadvantage compared with its near neighbours.
This marginalisation translated into some appalling conditions
at ground level. Built over a century earlier and for a very different
purpose, much of the Springﬁeld accommodation was inappropri-
ate and in a poor state of repair. More disturbing than the physical
conditions, however, were the attitudes and practices of a
dominant section of the workforce which were more akin to
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hospital:
The place was such an utter disgrace. I mean so terrible, the
environment and the attitudesy the conditions were horri-
ﬁcy as well as the appalling physical conditions that there
were, people not having their own clothes, nowhere to keep
any possessions, and all this sort of stuff.
(Interview 4: Member of North Manchester DHA)
The extent of the problem was highlighted in a series of
damning external reports published in the early 1980s, including
one from the Hospital Advisory Service which described Spring-
ﬁeld as ‘one of the worst hospital sites they had visited in the
country’ (Social Services Inspectorate, 1986, p. 34).
Given this situation, it is perhaps surprising that North
Manchester became a site of innovation. I would argue, however,
that it was its very status as a backwater which created some of
the conditions for innovation. Firstly, away from the scrutiny and
inﬂuence of Manchester’s medical and psychiatric fraternities
there was more freedom to experiment outside conventional
channels; and secondly, Springﬁeld was politically very weak. This
meant that although there was huge internal resistance to change,
this resistance was ultimately feeble since it lacked support from
outside. Operating almost in a political vacuum, Springﬁeld was
clearly a prime site for revolution!(footnote continued)
politically but determined to change North Manchester (Jones and Pickstone,
2008).The who and the how of change
The drivers of change
She was very unusual, in that she just wasn’t concerned with
her own professional power there. I mean she tried to use it to
make something happen but she was equally at home with ..
you know, she basically wanted other people who were
thinking in the same way that she was, rather than anything
else. And she operated in a very different way from most
doctors that you might ever come across, and that went on in
her personal life as well, and her personal life and her kind of
public life were not particularly separated, and so once you
became part of that kind of y set of people you were part of
that set of people. So it was very, it’s part of a radical milieu
that was around at that time.
(Interview 1: Research Assistant, Getting to Know You Project)
Interestingly—though, given the politics of Springﬁeld, not
altogether unsurprisingly—the initial drivers of change came from
outside the institution. They also had a non-psychiatric back-
ground: Drs. Joyce Leeson and Judith Gray were in North
Manchester’s Department of Community Medicine, which after
the NHS re-organisation of 1974 had inherited many of the local
functions of the city’s Public Health department. Leeson and Gray
joined the newly autonomous health authority in 1982. Both were
committed feminists and left wing radicals, who spent their
professional lives explicitly working towards a more democratic
health service through greater participation, collaboration and
involvement of patients, local communities and staff at all levels
(Leeson and Gray, 1978; Leeson, 1991).
Joyce Leeson was North Manchester’s District Medical Ofﬁcer
and extremely well respected by the chair of the district health
authority (DHA), who had encouraged her to apply for the post.77 She has been a leading ﬁgure in the Department of Community Medicine in
the Medical School of the University of Manchester, where he, an eminent
academic dentist, had been Dean. She had moved into the NHS after not being
appointed to the professorship in community medicine; he was less radicalAs the senior local ﬁgure in Community Medicine and a member
of the DHA, her main role in this story is that of supporter and
enabler—backed up by a signiﬁcant degree of power and
inﬂuence: as one interviewee observed, ‘Joyce certainly was a
terribly powerful woman. Terribly powerful’ (Interview 6: Mem-
ber of the Getting to Know You Core Planning Group). This
inﬂuential position at the strategic level was complemented on
the ground by the less conventional, but equally formidable force
of her newly appointed Specialist in Community Medicine, Judith
Gray. Judith was, by all accounts, a strongly charismatic ﬁgure,
variously described in my interviews as ‘an inspirational sort of
person’ ‘a very charismatic public health doctor’ ‘a huge maverick’
and a ‘rather wonderful woman’. Despite holding a senior position
in the medical hierarchy she was, in essence, a grassroots activist
who was deeply connected, in a myriad of ways, to the
oppositional movements and networks described above. It was
this grassroots approach which characterised her response when,
in June 1982, she was invited by the DHA to review plans for a
proposed psychiatric day centre.8 Two months later her remit was
considerably broadened when she volunteered to coordinate a
service development strategy exercise focussing this time on
Springﬁeld’s long-stay population.
The mechanics of change: Getting to Know You
The whole thing was about giving people back their dignity
and giving them a life back.
(Interview 7: Nurse/Nurse Manager at Springﬁeld Hospital)
The vehicle of change was Getting to Know You: a project which,
in contrast to more conventional approaches to service planning,
was designed to involve and engage as many staff—and, indeed
patients—as possible. Explicitly built around the principles of
normalisation (Wolfensberger, 1972; Brown and Smith, 1992) and
based on a Canadian scheme of the same name (Brost and
Johnson, 1982), its ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ approach
would, it was claimed, create a very different type of service: one
which was deﬁned and shaped by the needs of real users rather
than the goals and constraints of the organisation.
The project was in two stages. The initial phase took the form
of a detailed individual assessment exercise. Around 20 volun-
teers, a mixture of managers and practitioners, took part—
although the method of recruitment, a series of meetings ‘almost
like a moving road show selling the opportunity to discuss
and change present services’ (Thomas and Rose, 1986, p. 4), and
the nature of the exercise itself created a much higher level of
visibility within the hospital than these numbers might suggest.
The assessments, designed to ‘strip staff of their ‘professional’
assumptions and allow them to feel again the raw experience of
the lives of those who use our service’ (Thomas and Rose, 1986, p.
4), involved spending many hours ‘getting to know’ an individual
patient; slowly building up a detailed picture, both of the them as
people—as opposed to clinical entities—and of the pattern and
quality of their daily lives. Once completed, the assessments fed
directly into the service design phase, to which representatives
from social services and MIND were also invited. This culminated
in the creation of a set of service design principles, which, it was8 This ﬁrst project led to the setting up of Powell St., one of the earliest
community mental health centres in the country. Like Harpurhey, it was designed
to challenge traditional service models: deliberately located in a terraced house in
a back street it was built around the principles of neighbourhood working,
community development, user participation and democratic team relationships
(Newbigging et al., 1989).
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which was eventually to become the bedrock of the Harpurhey
Team.9 In line with its normalisation roots, the emphasis was on
enabling individuals not only to live in their local community but
to experience an ordinary lifestyle, with genuine access to local
facilities and activities and meaningful contact with local people.
While considerable attention was thus paid to the identiﬁcation
and use of community resources there was no mention of
specialist services and facilities nor of the medical aspects of care.
Unsurprisingly, given the impoverished lives of most hospital
residents, the very personal nature of the assessment process had
a profound impact on many of the participants, evoking anger and
distress and causing them to re-appraise both their patients and
their professional practice (Thomas and Rose, 1986). Indeed, a
striking feature—and an undoubted strength—of the Getting to
Know You project was the way in which its radicalism was
balanced by a deep humanitarianism. This meant that it had a
very broad appeal, bringing together two very different groups
with very different world views. So, while the agenda for some
was strongly political, confronting issues of power, authority and
control, for others the issue was more immediate and practical:
This wasn’t just about a support service to twenty people y
the whole process was one of transferring resources into the
community so that they became community resources, not just
resources for those twenty peopley That de-institutionalisa-
tion is not just going to be a micro-project to set up nice little
new services, it’s about the whole processes of institutional
practicey it’s about the power of professionals, it’s abouty
how much power the community has, and is reﬂective of an
erayand the politics that challenged institutional authority.
(Interview 2: Nurse on the Harpurhey Resettlement Team)
The ‘Getting to Know You’ stuff was about just that, we can
build a service for people if you get to know ‘em. Get to know
what they want out of life, what services they’ve had, what
kind of experiences they’ve had, what they want, what they
can do, what they can’t do, what their strengths are, their
assets, you know, all that kind of stuff, and it was a new way of
workingyIt was a new, good way of working y I thought,
bloody hell, this is a real refreshing way of ..working with
people and just more human wayyso I sort of bought into it.
y But I didn’t have the idea that ..let’s bring down the
traditional way of doing something, I just thought, you know,
let’s see if there’s a better way of doing it. I wasn’t openly that
radical or that trailblazing or carrying ﬂags or anything like
that, I just wanted to do a good job in a different way, I think.
(Interview 8: Nurse on the Harpurhey Resettlement Team)
This unlikely alliance of mental health activists and more
conventional, practice-oriented professionals created a powerful
force, uniting senior managers, staff at ground level and a range of
actors from outside the institution, in what Thomas and Rose
(1986, p. 18) refer to as ‘an atmosphere of change’.
Support was, however, far from universal. The psychiatrists
had already demonstrated their disapproval of the project by
choosing not to participate in the original working group. When
the ﬁnal report was put out for consultation in September 1984
this disapproval turned into massive opposition. According to9 The service principles remained a key reference point throughout the team’s
history: several interviewees have described how the teamwould refer back to the
design principles when disagreements arose; and even when they evolved into a
full community mental health team in the early 1990s, they retained their original
service principles, including them in their collection of Key Documents (Harpurhey
and East Manchester Mental Health Service, undated).many supporters of the scheme this was largely about profes-
sional power and status:
We were dismantling their empire, it’s a simple as that. Their
empire was this catchment in-patient population that they
could do what they wanted to. They didn’t have a voice, they
didn’t have a say in their treatment, they didn’t have much of a
say in their care and they were overmedicated in many cases.
And we were saying to the consultants ‘Actually we’re going to
close this place down and you won’t have a job’.
(Interview 7: Nurse/Nurse Manager at Springﬁeld Hospital)
What was under threat for the psychiatrists was not only their
traditional constituencies—the several hundred in-patients who
constituted the bulk of North Manchester’s mental health
population—but the relationships which structured those con-
stituencies and which, more importantly, deﬁned and conﬁrmed
both the psychiatrists’ professional identity and their position
within the organisation. Given their already marginalised posi-
tion, it is thus not surprising that Springﬁeld’s psychiatrists felt
especially vulnerable and outraged—particularly since the threat
was coming from a number of directions, both inside and outside
the hospital, and was being successfully spearheaded by a female
public health doctor who, in traditional terms, was even lower on
the pecking order than themselves.
These negative responses were not driven by self-interest
alone, however. For many—psychiatrists and nursing staff
alike—Getting to Know You represented a betrayal, not only of
their professional values and practices, but, more importantly, of
the patients themselves. There were serious doubts about both
the ability of many long-stay patients to survive in the outside
world and the ethics of moving people out of what had effectively
become their home:
We got an awful lot of stickyfrom other, you know, people-
ysaying, ‘Poor Freddy, look at, how can you be exposing him
to that kind of risk? How can youy he’s warm, he’s safe, he’s
this, that, and the other here, this is his home, this is his life.
What right have you got?’
(Interview 8: Nurse on the Harpurhey Resettlement Team)
With such polarised views, the debate became increasingly
acrimonious—something which is reﬂected in the strong emotions
and highly charged comments evoked during some of my inter-
views, conducted over 20 years after these events. Although often
couched in quite personal and derogatory terms—incompetent,
retrogressive psychiatrists versus naı¨ve and dangerous subversi-
ves—the problems were, however, ultimately more structural and
conceptual in nature; the product of a power struggle between two
very different cultures, fuelled on one side by anger and hope, and
on the other by a deep sense of threat and betrayal.
The mediators of change: North Manchester DHA, the dowry system
and general management
Let’s be clear, if that dowry system hadn’t appeared we would
now not be talking, we’d just be talking about some nice piece
of paper that some of us produced at some point, because
without that we’d never have had the money to make it
happen.
(Interview 1: Research Assistant, Getting to Know You Project)
Grifﬁths has got a lot to be proud of y none of these things
that we’re now talking about, even given the sort of promising
starts, could have happened without general management.
(Interview 9: District Psychologist)
ARTICLE IN PRESS
V. Harrington / Health & Place 15 (2009) 664–671670At this stage in the story it is tempting to view the eventual
launch of the Harpurhey Resettlement Team as a political victory
for Judith Gray and the direct outcome of the Getting To Know You
project. And indeed, during the early stages of my research this is
how I understood it. However, although Getting to Know You
played a pivotal role in the creation of Thomas and Rose’s
‘atmosphere for change’, it was in itself an insufﬁcient condition
for that change. What was needed was a supportive infrastructure
within which the reformers’ ideas and energy could be translated
into concrete action. This support came from three separate
sources. The ﬁrst was the district health authority which, as the
body ultimately responsible for the quality of North Manchester’s
health services, had the power to drive through the changes. In
the wake of a series of adverse inspections it also had the
incentive:
The health authority was responsible for those services that
were provided, and because they were seen as unacceptable
..as I said, if you’ve had a number of external reports which
raised questions about what’s happening, you cannot ignore
that. It’s at your peril if you do.
(Interview 5: Member of North Manchester DHA)
Perhaps less obvious are the reasons why the DHA chose to
listen to a public health doctor rather than consulting more
conventional sources of psychiatric wisdom—particularly given
the proximity of Manchester University’s Department of Psychia-
try. First was the ﬁgure of Joyce Leeson, whose inﬂuential position
enabled her to mediate between Judith and the board members,
particularly the chair. Secondly, the timing was favourable. Judith
joined North Manchester at a time when its services were being
looked at afresh by a newly appointed health authority, eager to
make its mark.10 Not yet ground down by the inevitable setbacks
and pressures of NHS politics, the ‘infant’ committee was more
likely to view innovative ideas with enthusiastic optimism rather
than cynical defensiveness. Ultimately, however, it was, in the
words of one of its members, about:
the kind of authority it was y the collection of people who
were therey People who would ask questions and not accept
the status quo.
(Interview 5: Member of North Manchester DHA)
This was in part a product of the character and leadership style
of the chair, Joe Moore (Jones and Pickstone, 2008), and in part a
consequence of the particular mix of committee members. Unlike
its counterparts in Central and South, where the university and its
teaching hospitals wielded a powerful inﬂuence, North Manche-
ster DHA was not dominated by ‘the powerful presence of
teaching professors leaning on everybody’ or ‘self-opinionated
and powerful’ consultants (Interview 4: Member of North
Manchester DHA). This gave more voice to people from non-
medical backgrounds—including, signiﬁcantly, a local councillor
who was heavily involved in both left wing politics and voluntary
sector issues and a Community Health Council representative
with a background in academic sociology. This very different
political balance produced an ethos and context which was far
more open to the anti-establishment ﬁgure of Judith Gray.
The second source of support came from the Region and its
strategy for the rundown and closure of its large mental hospitals
(NWRHA, 1985). Although the Getting to Know project was clearly
independent of any government initiative, it coincided with the10 North Manchester DHA came out of the 1982 NHS reorganisation. Prior to
this the district had been part of Manchester Area Health Authority. See Jones and
Pickstone (2008) for more details of the reorganisation in Manchester.Tory administration’s ﬁnal push towards de-institutionalisation.
And although North Manchester’s proposed new service may not
have been quite what the government, nor the regional health
authority, had in mind, it ﬁtted the national resettlement agenda
perfectly. Because of this the authority were able to apply for
regional funding. This took two forms: the ﬁrst, a 3-year bridging
fund grant of £115,000 per annum, ﬁnanced the initial setting up
period, giving the team time to develop the service, prepare the
patients and, crucially, to work with the local community prior to
discharge. The second was the dowry system, which provided an
annual payment of £13,500 (rising to £15,500), guaranteed for life,
for each person who was resettled. With the ﬁnancial backing of
the RHA, a project which in normal circumstances would have
been dismissed outright by Springﬁeld’s ﬁnance ofﬁcers suddenly
became not only realisable, but promised a level of resources
which most mental health services could only dream of.
Given the project’s radical origins and democratic principles,
the ﬁnal source of support was perhaps the most surprising. In
September 1986, Edna Robinson, one of a new breed of general
managers, took up her post as Sub-unit General Manager,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement. Introduced in the context of
the Thatcher government’s drive for increased efﬁciency, and with
an emphasis on individual accountability, monitoring and cost
improvement, general management in the health service was
viewed with suspicion and resentment by many professionals
(Grifﬁths, 1983; Ham, 2004; Harrison et al., 1989). For the
emergent resettlement team, however, Edna’s appointment
proved absolutely critical. When she arrived the scheme was
already well behind schedule: in the face of uncooperative
psychiatrists and a senior nurse manager with her own deploy-
ment agenda, only a handful of suitable patients had been
identiﬁed and there were serious disagreements about the
composition and structure of the home support team. Within 6
months the service was up and running, Edna having played a
central role not only in overseeing—and indeed expediting—the
ﬁnal stages of the project, but also in galvanising and strengthen-
ing support within the hospital. The details of how she achieved
this are beyond the remit of this paper. What is signiﬁcant in this
context, however, is the unusual alliance which formed between a
mainstream manager, speaking the language of performance
management and service models, and a group of radical and/or
highly idealistic and committed practitioners—the unexpected
but constructive convergence of two apparently contradictory
cultures.Conclusion: contradictions and convergences; place and space
It was a particular thing in a particular time.
(Interview 6: Member of the Getting to Know You Core Planning
Group)
The role of Edna Robinson is only one of several contradictions
in the story. Another was the way inwhich such radical ideas were
able to take root within the context, ﬁrstly of a hugely reactionary
organisation and secondly of a strongly right wing government.
And third were the cultural contradictions: the unlikely yet
productive alliances of radicals and traditionalists, managers and
staff, insiders and outsiders; and the convergence of anti-
establishment models and mainstream policies and structures.
It is the title of this paper, Innovation in a Backwater, which
contains the central paradox, however: that ‘the arse-hole of
universe’, a marginalised and neglected institution, should
become the site of such innovation. And while, as the above
quotation captures, this can be partially understood in terms of
timing—the fortuitous convergence of local initiatives and
ARTICLE IN PRESS
V. Harrington / Health & Place 15 (2009) 664–671 671national policies, and of key actors brought together within a very
particular social, economic and political climate—it is the notion
of place which occupies centre stage in any analysis. As Philo and
Pickstone (2009) have already highlighted, place encompasses a
variety of meanings and dimensions. Echoing Moran and Topp’s
(2007, p. 4) remarks about ‘the role built space played in
narratives of psychiatric progress’, it was, for example, Spring-
ﬁeld’s appalling physical conditions which served as one of the
triggers for service development; while its proximity to—and
separation from—the general hospital both reﬂected and helped
shape the institution’s ‘unpromising conﬁgurations’ of social and
political relationships. Within such a marginalised location, ‘the
complex intersection between space and surveillance’ (Moran and
Topp, 2007, p. 4) played out in unexpected ways, the relative
absence of surveillance by Manchester’s psychiatric elite creating
a space not only for change, but for a change process which was
highly unusual in both form and outcome. ‘Space, as Foucault
argues, is a metaphor for a site of power which usually constrains
but can also liberate’ (Gittins, 1998, p. 5). Sheltered from the
constraints of mainstream psychiatry, a space which had more
often been associated with oppressive attitudes and backward
practices became, however, partially and temporarily, a site of
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